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 ‘Not everything that can be counted counts, 
and not everything that counts can be
counted.’
Albert Einstein, quoted in Kaufmann, 2003:5
Accurately evaluating the exposure to
sovereign risk and assessing the quality of
governance in emerging market economies
and developing countries have become critical
tasks for country risk rating agencies,
international investment banks and multi-
lateral financial institutions (Christl, 2001).
International investors are increasingly relying
on country risk data to better gauge business
opportunities and foresee major crises in
increasingly volatile emerging markets. 
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Accurately evaluating country risk and assessing the quality of governance in emerging
market economies has become a priority of international corporations, investment banks
and multilateral financial institutions. The rating system of the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), constitutes one of the most
influential time-series databases of country risk analysis. This study assesses the accuracy
and predictive powers of the ICRG model, evaluating its ability to discern trends and
highlight structural vulnerabilities, and thus to warn of impending crises. Three major
crises are examined: the Brazilian financial crisis of 1999, the Argentine economic
meltdown in December 2001 and the Peruvian political crisis of 2000. The study finds
mixed results, which have important implications for research and policy. JEL codes: A10,
F35, F47, G24
02  NOPEC  29  (2)  Linder    09.12.03    13:50    Side  105The turbulent decade of the 1990s was
marked by recurrent crises that rocked the
once-promising emerging markets and
revealed the weaknesses of new and restored
democracies. Uncertainty and vulnerability
are inherent features of emerging market
economies. From Indonesia to Argentina,
from Russia to Brazil, financial crises have
often had their origins in the intrinsic
weaknesses of the institutions of governance.
They have fueled a backlash against the neo-
liberal recipes of the Washington consensus’
economic policies, especially in Latin
America where a decade of reforms has failed
to significantly enhance growth and equity
(Stallings and Peres, 2000; Santiso, 2004b
and 2003).
In developing countries and transitional
economies, donor governments and inter-
national financial institutions have invested
extensive resources in evaluating the quality
of government and the soundness of
economic policy. They have attempted to
identify feasible qualitative and quantitative
indicators to assess the quality of governance
in order better to target assistance and
improve aid effectiveness. Based on recent
research on the effectiveness of aid in good
policy environments, development assistance
is becoming increasingly selective and
targeted at poor countries with ‘sound
policies’ and adequate institutions (World
Bank, 1998; Santiso, 2002 and 2001a). The
World Bank has developed indicators of
governance and institutional quality, which
inform its concessional lending policies to
poor countries in the context of the Inter-
national Development Association (IDA)
(World Bank, 2002). More recently in 2002,
the United States government launched a
new initiative aimed at increasing foreign aid
levels by $5 billion to $15 billion by 2006,
the  Millennium Challenge Account, which
selectively targets US bilateral aid to poor
countries with sound policies and good
governance. Indicators of government per-
formance and governance quality figure
prominently in the process of selecting aid
recipients (Radelet, 2003 and 2002; Birdsall
et al, 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002).
Country risk ratings and government
performance indicators are thus the subject
of renewed interest by scholars and policy-
makers alike. This study focuses on one of
the most prominent and influential providers
of indicators of governance quality and
sovereign risk, the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) database of the Political Risk
Service (PRS) Group. The PRS Group is the
only risk-rating agency to provide detailed
and consistent monthly data over an
extended period for a large number of
countries. It has provided country risk
ratings covering a broad repertoire of
countries since 1979. These ratings are used
by some 80 percent of the world’s largest
global companies,1 as well as aid donors and
international financial institutions such as
the World Bank. The PRS Group has devised
two systems for evaluating the risks faced by
business in countries around the globe, one
of which is the ICRG. The ICRG system
rates political, economic, and financial risks,
breaking each down into its key components,
as well as compiling composite ratings and
forecasts. The ICRG rating system comprises
22 variables in three subcategories of risk.
The study critically assesses the concep-
tual foundations and predictive powers of the
ICRG rating system. While it would be
unrealistic to expect the ICRG data to
accurately and precisely predict crises, one
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series data to reflect trends, highlight struc-
tural vulnerabilities and provide early
warning signals. Furthermore, while country
risk ratings and governance indicators cannot
be expected to give an absolute value of the
level of risk or the quality of governance, one
might reasonably expect from them a relative
measure of these. 
Few studies question the theoretical
underpinnings and predictive powers of such
datasets. This study aims to contribute to this
debate by assessing the accuracy of the ICRG
model. Until recently, economic and finan-
cial data analyses were the main determinants
of financial decisions of firms. Major
political events in the last few decades have,
nevertheless, highlighted the need for taking
political considerations into account when
forecasting country risk. However, reducing
often disparate and generalized political
information to precise and objective
indicators, which can be readily used in
forecasting models, presents significant
challenges. Moreover, the subjective nature
of some of the indicators contained in these
datasets questions their reliability as a guide
to policy.
The ICRG model comprises estimations
of economic and financial as well as political
risk. The former two categories generally
lend themselves to more precise quantitative
definitions, while the latter commonly is
based on survey data of a limited pool of
experts and therefore more dependent on
individuals’ perceptions. Risks here are
understood to entail events or vulnerabilities
such as increasing government instability or a
sudden eruption of conflict, which may lead
to direct or indirect threats to business
activities in emerging markets. The study
focuses on sovereign risk, that is, the ability
of the government and its agencies, as
opposed to private entities, to repay a loan.
What can reasonably be expected of these
instruments ultimately depends on their
intended purpose. In order to assess the ICRG
model, its purpose must first be established.
Often, clients tend to over-estimate the
accuracy and reliability of country risk
ratings. However, the ICRG risk-rating
model should be evaluated based on the
model’s stated aims and recognized abilities,
not on the expectations placed upon them by
clients. According to the PRS Group, the
ICRG rating system aims to provide an
assessment of countries’ political stability,
their economic strengths and weaknesses as
well as their ability to finance their official,
commercial and trade debt obligations. As
such, the criteria for evaluating the model
should be based on its ability to detect and
anticipate underlying vulnerabilities poten-
tially leading to a crisis, and specify the nature
of such a crisis, in particular distinguish
between the relative importance of financial,
economic and political dimensions.
Fundamentally, country risk ratings are to be
understood as assessments of exposure to risk,
rather than predictors of crises. Expectations
on the performance of such ratings systems
must be kept realistic and must take into
account the unpredictable nature of country
dynamics. 
This study looks at three instances of
crisis in relatively similar emerging markets
in Latin America: the exchange rate crisis in
Brazil in 1999, the financial collapse and
economic meltdown of Argentina in
2001–02, and the political and electoral
crisis in Peru in 2000–01. The specific nature
of each of these crises signals the presence of
specific problems, be they financial,
economic or political. The accuracy of the
ICRG risk ratings is thus assessed in each
individual case based on its ability to discern
ex ante the main determinants of a crisis, e.g.
its underlying nature. Based on disaggregated
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as well as the composite risk rating, the study
assesses the extent to which the ICRG model
was able to foresee these crises or detect
trends pointing to the structural vulnera-
bilities, which ultimately produced the crises.
This method of evaluation is admittedly
rudimentary, yet it allows us to pinpoint
structural weaknesses in the predictive power
of risk ratings and governance indicators. 
These three events were selected because
they represent three distinct types of crises,
which occurred in three middle-income
emerging economies in the same region and
over the same period, essentially the late 1990s
and early 2000s. The three countries were
characterized by significant economic,
financial and political volatility and vulner-
ability in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the
case of Argentina and Brazil, these crises also
had significant systemic consequences for the
region. Case selection is based on the most
similar method of comparative inquiry, as this
approach allows us to better capture how well
the ICRG is able to detect the emergence of a
crisis or, at least, its nature. Although in all
three cases financial, economic and political
factors are closely intertwined, the Brazilian
crisis was primarily a financial one, while the
Argentine crisis was an economic collapse
rooted in a dysfunctional political system, and
the Peruvian crisis was essentially a political
one. Thus, the evaluation approach attempts
to neutralize some exogenous variables related
to the dissimilar character of country and
historical contexts.
The article is structured in four substan-
tive sections. The first section compares and
contrasts the purpose and origin of
commercial country risk ratings and non-
commercial governance indicators, while the
second one specifies the ICRG model. The
third section examines the three country case
studies of Brazil, Argentina and Peru. The
fourth section draws tentative conclusions,
underscoring the caveats of political risks
analysis. 
Country Risk Ratings and
Governance Indicators
Assessing country risk and gauging the
quality of governance in emerging market
economies represent tremendous conceptual
and policy challenges to both policy-makers
and researchers, as well as to financial
analysts and aid practitioners. Country risk
broadly refers to the likelihood that a
sovereign state may be unable or unwilling to
fulfill its obligations towards one or more
lenders (Krayenbuehl, 1985). Political risk
refers to “those political and social develop-
ments that can have an impact upon the
value or repatriation of foreign investment or
on the repayment of cross-border lending.
These developments may originate either
within the host country, in the international
arena, or in the home-country environment”
(Simon, 1992:118). A primary function of
country risk assessment is thus to anticipate
with reasonable early warning the possibility
of debt repudiation, default or delays in
payment by sovereign borrowers.
The search for adequate indicators of
governance performance and institutional
quality has attracted considerable interest
from a variety of sources. There now exists a
wide variety of country risk ratings and
indicators of governance performance. A first
distinction between risk ratings and
governance indicators concerns their purpose.
Broadly speaking, there have been two main
thrusts behind the articulation of such
indexes. On the one hand, there is the need
by international investment banks to better
assess sovereign risk in order to mitigate the
exposure to sudden reversals of investment
conditions (i.e. measuring risk and exposure
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context has been based on economic and
financial indicators, but in recent years there
has been an increased appreciation of the
importance of also taking political indicators
into account when assessing the overall risk
of any emerging market economy. On the
other hand, there is also the need by
international financial institutions to assess
the quality of governance to better target
development assistance through increased
selectivity (i.e. assessing performance). 
Governance indicators
A second, yet related, distinction concerns
their source. Non-commercial indices, such as
Freedom House’s indices of civil liberties and
political rights or Transparency Inter-
national’s corruption perception index fulfill
a different purpose embedded in the ethical
values that they aim to promote. These
indices are however riddled with measure-
ment and comparability problems, which
make them unsuitable for cross-temporal
analysis. The widely used Freedom House
data, for example, is not designed as a series;
its scale changes over time. Similarly, Trans-
parency International’s corruption percep-
tion index is an un-weighted aggregate of
several indices and surveys of corruption.
The annual assessments do not include the
same samples, which are enlarged as the
exercise is repeated. 
The Polity IV and Polyarchy datasets,
which are often used to evaluate the quality
of democracy, are much more accurate and
refined measures of governance. Both are
based on solid theoretical frameworks and
consistent time-series going back to the early
1800’s. Largely based on the ground
breaking work of Ted Gurr, the Polity dataset
evaluates the degree of democratization of a
state by codifying four institutional
dimensions with the objective of placing
political regimes along a democracy –
autocracy continuum. The index it generates
is a combination of a democracy scale
(political participation, competition, open-
ness, and constraints on chief executive) and
an autocracy scale (lack of competition,
regulations of political participation, lack of
competitiveness, and lack of constraints),
each composed of four categories. The Polity
dataset was originally constructed to test the
durability of states (Gurr, 1974; Gurr,
Jaggers and Moore, 1990; Jaggers and Gurr,
1995; Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). 
Tatu Vanhanen’s Polyarchy dataset covers
187 countries over the period 1810 to 1998
(Vanhanen, 2000). Vanhanen’s index of
democracy offers a measure of the quality of
democracy assessing the degree of partici-
pation (measured by the percentage of voters
as per the voting-age population) and
competition (assessed by the relative weight
of the ruling party), largely based on Dahl’s
concept of polyarchy (Dahl, 1971.)
Vanhanen originally constructed the
Polyarchy dataset to “explain the emergence
of democracy” (Vanhanen, 2000:253).
These indices have contributed to shift
the debate on “what democracy is ... and is
not” (Schmitter and Karl, 1991) to
qualitative assessments of the degree of
democracy or the level of democratization,
thereby conceptualizing democratization as a
continuous rather than dichotomous
variable. Vanhanen’s index of democracy is a
continuum while the Polity project adopts a
scalar approach. They reflect a growing
concern to better capture the nature of
political regimes in the gray area between
liberal democracies and overt autocracies.
Consequently, however, they are also marred
by problems of measurement and accuracy,
as they are largely based on subjective
measurements. (Gates al., 2001).
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On the other hand, the majority of risk
ratings produced by private companies such
as Fitch Ratings, the Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU), the Business Environment Risk
Intelligence (BERI), Institutional Investor,
Standard and Poor’s Rating Group or
Moody’s Investors Services essentially serve a
commercial purpose aimed at assisting
investment banks in their portfolio decisions.
Their primary aim is to assess the level of
sovereign risk and their clients’ exposure to
it. Each of the rating providers must amalga-
mate a range of quantitative and qualitative
information into a single index or rating. 
For example, the Business Environment
Risk Intelligence (BERI) provides two
services: the Business Risk Service and the
Forelend or Lender Risk Rating. Eighteen
BERI analysts analyze various sources of
country data and produce initial draft
reports, which are submitted to a panel of
experts. BERI relies on two permanent
panels of some 150 experts worldwide for
country ratings and qualitative observations
based on the initial reports by the BERI
analysts. One of the two panels assesses
political conditions and the other provides
perspectives on the business-operating
environment. Similarly, the Business Risk
Service (BRS) monitors 50 countries three
times per year and provides assessment of 57
criteria in three separate indices: the Political
Risk Index (PRI), the Operation Risk Index
(ORI) and the R factor. The PRI relies on the
ratings of diplomats and political scientists of
six internal causes of political risk, two
external causes and two symptoms of
political risk. The ORI highlights major
obstacles to business development, and the R
factor measures a country’s willingness to
allow foreign companies to convert and
repatriate profits and to import production
components and raw materials. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
provides analysis and forecasts of the
political, economic and business environ-
ment in over 180 countries. In 1997, the
EIU launched two quarterly publications:
the Country Risk Service (CRS) and the
Country Forecasts (CFs). These publications
rely on a network of more than 500
information-gatherers for risk assessments,
which are also checked for accuracy and
consistency by a panel of regional experts.
The CRS covers 100 emerging markets and
provides risk ratings for seven categories of
country risk: political, economic policy,
economic structure, liquidity, currency,
sovereign debt and banking sector. The
political risk category is divided into two
components: political stability, which
examines whether the political scene is free of
internal or external threats to security; and
political effectiveness, which assesses the
quality of governance. The CFs cover 60
countries and measure the quality of the
business environment. They are designed to
reflect the main criteria used by companies to
formulate their global business strategies, and
cover ten criteria.2
In the past few years, international
financial institutions such as the World Bank
and regional development banks have
invested significant resources to assess the
determinants of institutional quality, govern-
ance performance and economic growth, as
well as the causality chains between these
110 Anja Linder and Carlos Santiso
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to devise credible and reliable measures of
governance by aggregating different datasets
from different sources in order to reduce
measurement discrepancies. The World Bank
Institute (WBI) developed a dataset of
aggregated governance indicators combining
commercial and non-commercial indicators
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón.,
1999a and 1999b; Kaufmann and Kraay,
2002b.) This time-series dataset covers 175
countries since 1996. It constructed aggre-
gate indicators of perceptions of governance,
organized in six clusters corresponding to six
basic dimensions of governance (Kaufmann,
2003; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002a.)  The
first two clusters are intended to capture the
process by which those in authority are
selected and replaced, and include indicators
of  “voice and accountability” and political
stability. The next two clusters include
indices measuring the government’s ability to
formulate and implement sound policies,
assessing both government effectiveness
(which include the quality of the bureaucracy
and the credibility of government’s
commitment to policies) and regulatory
quality. The last two clusters summarize the
respect of citizens and the state for the
institutions that govern their interaction,
focusing on the rule of law and the control of
corruption.  
Indicators of governance performance
have considerable influence on foreign aid
policies. They are increasingly being used to
determine the level of concessional lending
and grant aid conceded to developing
countries, especially low-income countries.
In 1998, the twelfth replenishment of IDA
resources introduced a performance-based
aid allocation system (IDA 1988, 2001 and
2002). The IDA amended its guidelines to
better gauge the quality of economic
governance in recipient countries and its
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) framework was expanded to take into
consideration four indicators of institutional
quality: accountable and competent public
institutions, transparent economic and social
policies and practices, a predictable and
stable legal framework, and participation by
affected groups and civil society.3
More recently, the World Bank and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) launched an initia-
tive to devise “second-generation governance
indicators” with an emphasis on public sector
governance and the search for objective and
politically acceptable performance indicators
(Knack and Kugler, 2002; Knack, Kugler,
and Manning, 2000 and 2001.)
Nevertheless, although these sets of
indicators originate from different sources
and serve different purposes, they share
common concerns. Assessing the level of
sovereign risk and evaluating the quality of
governance are indeed the two sides of the
same coin. International financial institu-
tions and private investment banks have
increasingly relied on such indicators to
evaluate economic and social progress and
assess their exposure to country risk.
Econometric regression analyses and cross-
country studies have confirmed the linkages
between good governance and economic
performance, as well as between institutional
quality and aid effectiveness (Burnside and
Dollar, 1997 and 1998; World Bank, 1998;
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been designed to capture specific aspects of
governance and institutional quality with
particular implications for foreign invest-
ment.4 However, the process of identifying,
selecting and specifying risk ratings and
governance indicators is plagued with both
conceptual challenges and political problems.
More fundamentally, while tremendous
progress has been achieved in recent years in
refining governance indicators, allowing for a
wave of cross-country econometric analyses,
few indicators are available to assess long-
term trends, as there exist few consistent
time-series. 
Critics have questioned the utility of
trying to aggregate a wide range of factors
into one single indicator to assess the risk
potential in a specific country at a specific
time. They have also argued that the
statistical methods used in quantitative
assessments of risk are based on the
assumption that the analysis of past events
may be used to forecast the future. This, they
argue, is not necessarily true (Goldberg and
Haendel, 1987). Such criticism notwith-
standing, the ability to make an informed
assessment as to the different components
and level of risk in any one particular
country, based on that country’s economic,
political, financial and social environment is
critical for the multitude of international
banks and multinational businesses
operating around the world. Moreover, and
although political risk analysis is not
foolproof, it can offer a guide for reducing
some of the uncertainty in foreign political
and social developments that may have an
impact on foreign lending and investment
(Harms, 2000; Simon, 1992). It is,
nevertheless, important to be aware of the
choices and assumptions underlying such
indicators.
This study looks at the performance of all
three ratings indices of the ICRG system as
well as the composite rating index. The
conceptual analysis, nevertheless, centers on
the political risk rating, its most controversial
component, in an attempt to discern its
contribution as well as any problems
associated with its use. Political risk analysis
is indeed often based on qualitative indi-
cators, reflecting perceptions or judgments
by competent observers captured in survey
data. While time-series data is usually lacking
for testing causality, pooled data is subject to
the problem of scaling across countries.
Experts surveyed for qualitative assessments
of political risk, moreover, sometimes allow
their judgment to be clouded by
preconceptions of expected events or by the
influence of past events.
The ICRG Model5
The PRS risk rating system assigns a
numerical value to a predetermined range of
risk components, according to a preset
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the greatest value to the lowest risk and the
lowest value to the highest risk. There are
three categories of risk components: political,
economic and financial risk. The sum of the
risk points assigned to each risk component
within each risk category determines the
overall risk rating for that category. The
composite risk index is then calculated based
on the three different risk categories
according to a formula, where the political
risk rating contributes 50 percent and the
economic and financial risk ratings each
contribute 25 percent. The data used for this
study encompasses three countries, Argen-
tina, Brazil and Peru, and spans from January
1990 to January 2002.
The risk rating categories
The main aim of the political risk-rating
category is to provide an assessment of the
political stability in a specific country at a
specific time. The political risk rating is
based on points, which are assigned to a
number of components and sub-components
as listed in Table 1. The maximum number
of points is one hundred: the higher the total
number of points, the lower the risk, and the
lower the number of points, the higher the
risk. The ranges of the different risk levels are
described in Table 2. 
The first component of the political risk
rating, government stability, attempts to
capture the extent to which the government
is able to carry out its policies as well as its
ability to stay in office. A measure of socio-
economic conditions is included in order to
assess the socioeconomic pressures, which
could constrain government action or fuel
social discontent. The third component,
investment profile, assesses factors affecting
the risk to investment that are not covered by
other political, economic and financial risk
components. Data on external and internal
conflicts is included, as conflicts tend to have
a disruptive impact on governance. Corrup-
tion is included in the model, as it is a threat
to investment through its ability to distort
the economic and financial environment,
and reduce the efficiency of government and
business, and as it introduces an inherent
instability into the political process.
Furthermore, estimates of the influence of
the military on politics as well as of religion
on politics are introduced, as these two
factors might contribute to a reduction in
democratic accountability. The law and order
indicator assesses the strength and impartia-
lity of the legal system as well as popular
observance of the law. The ethnic tensions
component is an assessment of the degree of
tension within a country, which is attri-
butable to racial, nationality or language
divisions. Democratic accountability and
bureaucratic quality, finally, are included to
assess the responsiveness of government and
the institutional strength and quality of the
bureaucracy. The maximum value of the
aggregate political risk rating is 100. 
The economic risk rating aims to provide a
means of assessing a country’s current
economic strengths and weaknesses, and is
composed of five standard components,
widely used by most risk-rating agencies.
These include: per capita Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), real GDP growth, annual
inflation rate, budget balance as a percentage
of GDP, and the current account as a
percentage of GDP. The maximum value of
economic risk rating is 50. The financial risk
rating provides a means of assessing a
country’s ability to finance its official, com-
mercial and trade debt obligations. This
category is made up of five components:
foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign
debt service as a percentage of exports,
current account as a percentage of exports,
net international reserves in months of
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The maximum value of the financial risk
rating category is also 50.
Annexes 1 through 3 provide a graphical
overview of the country risk profiles of the
three countries under review for the period
between January 1990 and January 2002. As
shown in Table 2, the critical value below
which the risk is deemed as high is 60 for the
political risk rating, and 30 for both the
economic and the financial risk ratings. The
risk is viewed as very high at values below 50
114 Anja Linder and Carlos Santiso
Table 1.
The risk rating categories and their components
Political Risk Rating Economic Risk Rating Financial Risk Rating
Max Max Max
Government stability 12 GDP per capita 5 Foreign debt 10
Government unity 4 (as percentage of average) (as percentage of GDP)
Legislative strength 4
Popular support 4
Socioeconomic conditions 12 Real GDP growth 10 Foreign debt service 10
Unemployment 4 (as percentage of exports)
Consumer confidence 4
Poverty 4
Investment profile 12 Annual inflation rate 10 Current account 15
Contract viability/expropr 4 (as percentage of exports)
Profits repatriation 4
Payment delays 4
Internal conflict 12 Budget balance 10 Official reserves 5
Civil war 4 (% of GDP) (as months of import cover)
Terrorism/pol. violence 4
Civil disorder 4
External conflict 12 Current account 15 Exchange rate stability 10




Military in politics 6
Religion in politics 6




Sub-total 100 Sub-total 50 Sub-total 50
Source: PRS, 2001.
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the economic and financial risk ratings.
The composite risk rating
The composite political, financial and
economic risk rating (CPFER) is calculated
using the following formula:
CPFER = 0.5 * (PR + FR + ER)
PR = Total political risk indicators
FR = Total financial risk indicators
ER = Total economic risk indicators
The maximum rating possible is thus 100
and the lowest is 0. Again, the highest overall
rating indicates the lowest risk and the lowest
rating indicates the highest risk. Overall, the
ratings may be assessed according to the
categories shown in Table 3. As with the
political risk rating, the critical value below
which the composite risk is judged to be high
is 60.
Case Studies
The three case studies selected constitute
critical moments of crises. The dictionary
definition of a crisis is “a critical time of great
instability and strain”, or a “turning point,”
and that of risk is “possibility of loss or
injury.” The predictive powers of the ICRG
model and its ability to detect tendencies
towards such “critical moments” or “turning
points” are assessed in light of three crises.
First, the exchange rate crisis in Brazil and
subsequent devaluation of the Real in
January 1999 is examined, using monthly
data for the three disaggregated risk ratings as
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Table 2.
Risk rating ranges
Political risk Economic risk Financial risk
Very high risk 0 – 49.9 0 – 24.9 0 – 24.9
High risk 50 – 59.9 25 – 29.9 25 – 29.9
Moderate risk 60 – 69.9 30 – 34.9 30 – 34.9
Low risk 70 – 79.9 35 – 39.9 35 – 39.9
Very low risk 80 – 100 40 – 50 40 – 50
Source: PRS, 2001.
Table 3.
Composite risk rating ranges
Composite risk rating
Very high risk 0 – 49.9
High risk 50 – 59.9
Moderate risk 60 – 69.9
Low risk 70 – 79.9
Very low risk 80 – 100
Source: PRS, 2001.
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determine how well the model identified the
type of crisis and anticipated its emergence.
Second, the debt default and political crisis
in Argentina of December 2001 is examined.
The Argentine crisis was an economic
collapse rooted in the all-too-rigid economic
model of the 1991 “convertibility law.” The
Argentine dysfunctional political system
further compounded the economic and
financial problems and eventually also
collapsed. Third, the political crisis in Peru
leading to and resulting from the flawed
elections in April 2000, as President Alberto
Fujimori vied for a third term in office but
eventually went into exile, is also scrutinized. 
Brazil’s currency samba 
Upon assuming office in 1995, President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso set about
deregulating the Brazilian economy (Roett,
1999). His successful Real Plan, introduced
in 1994, shortly after his appointment as
finance minister, managed to cut inflation
and boost real incomes. His successes
notwithstanding, plans to reform the public
sector and the tax and social security systems,
necessary for the restoration of fiscal balance
and to improve industrial competitiveness,
were met with strong opposition in Congress
(EIU, 2001a). 
The lack of fiscal reform left Brazil
vulnerable to the effects of the 1997 East
Asian financial crisis and the subsequent
Russian crisis in 1998. As interest rates then
rose sharply in September 1998 in defense of
the exchange rate, the economy went into
recession. An agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
November 1998 helped relieve some of the
financial pressure. However, a corruption
scandal in November 1998 involving three
government figures close to the President
increased political tensions and further
weakened the government’s ability to carry
out its policies. The legislature’s rejection of
one of the main measures in the IMF-
supported fiscal adjustment package again
created turbulence in the markets. The final
straw was the debt moratorium declared by
the state of Minas Gerais in January 1999
(EIU, 2001a). Attempts by the Brazilian
Central Bank to fend off pressure on the
currency failed, and the real was eventually
allowed to float freely from 15 January 1999.
Though rising unemployment and falling
real wages weakened the Cardoso govern-
ment and caused a drop in the President’s
popularity, fears of steep increases in
inflation and a deep economic recession
proved baseless. Recent research has also
revealed the impact of electoral cycles on
financial markets’ perception of economic
and financial stability, which Juan Martínez
and Javier Santiso (2003) aptly describe as a
“confidence game.” Moreover, some of the
remaining measures of the IMF fiscal
package were passed during the first half of
1999, and fiscal austerity combined with
prudent monetary policy helped to stabilize
the economy, and contained inflation. The
adoption of the Fiscal Responsibility Law in
May 2000 also helped restore confidence in
the ability of government to reign in public
finances and correct some of the excesses of
the decentralized fiscal system. The recession
lasted just nine months and recovery in
output began during the fourth quarter of
1999 (EIU, 2001a). 
As evidenced by Graph 1 below, the
composite risk rating for Brazil dropped
sharply in late 1998 and indicated high risk
in early 1999. It went back up to moderate
risk in late 1999, indicating an improvement
in the overall risk indicators. It appears,
nevertheless, that a warning of high risk
surfacing only in early 1999 may not have
been a sufficient indicator of the challenges
116 Anja Linder and Carlos Santiso
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not correctly reflect the underlying causes of
financial vulnerability. Brazil’s composite risk
rating went below the 60 point mark (the
level below which the risk is deemed as high)
only during a brief period of time in 1999,
descending from the lowest risk level ever
attained by Brazil (almost 75 points) in late
1998. Annex 1 provides a graphical overview
of the country risk profile of Brazil. 
The Brazilian crisis was primarily a
financial one, and the financial rating indeed
dropped drastically, falling from a level of
very low risk to indicating very high risk
within a matter of months between late 1998
and the first half of 1999. The economic risk
rating also started dropping sharply towards
the end of 1998, displaying high levels of risk
towards the first half of 1999. In the case of
the economic and financial risk ratings, the
bold horizontal line at 30 in the graphs
indicates the level below which the risk is
deemed as high. Below 25, the risk is seen as
very high, and above 35, the risk is seen as
low. Looking at the components of the
financial risk rating, several of the indicators
would have been expected to indicate
potential weakness. For instance, with
increasing pressure on the Real, stemming
from a perception of it as being overvalued,
Brazil’s trade balance suffered, and as the
government attempted to buttress its fixed
exchange rate in the face of increasing
pressure, it eventually began losing valuable
international reserves. The current account
deficit had been growing but then started
decreasing, following the devaluation of the
Real in January 1999. 
The political risk rating dropped some-
what at the onset of the crisis, but remained
at the level of moderate risk. Looking at the
different components of the political risk
rating, government stability dropped some-
what, indicating greater risk, at the
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toward the beginning of 2000, albeit at a
lower level, indicating a structural deter-
ioration of the quality of governance. The
indicator on socioeconomic conditions
dropped in December 1998 to a high-risk
level and remained there until early 2001.
One might nevertheless speculate on the
relatively high score of Brazil’s political risk
rating (between 60 and 70 points throughout
the 1990s), given the inchoate nature of its
political system (Lamounier, 1999). Never-
theless, it appears that the ICRG model gave
correct and relatively timely warning of the
crisis and reflected the financial nature of the
crisis.
Argentina’s last tango 
The financial crisis is Argentina in 2001–03
is an economic failure as much as a political
one, due partly to the weakness of its
institutions of governance (Schamis 2002;
Pastor and Wise 2002; Santiso 2001b). After
a prolonged recession, which had been
exacerbated by the devaluation of the
Brazilian real in 1999, the Argentine govern-
ment finally defaulted on its US$132 billion
debt at the end of 2001 (Feldstein, 2002;
Schamis 2002; Mussa, 2002; Pastor and
Wise, 2001). Economic problems had been
growing for some time, causing social unrest,
and finally led to the fall of the government
of President Fernando De la Rúa on 24
December 2001. Soon thereafter, interim
President Adolfo Rodríguez Saa declared a
moratorium on Argentina’s international
debt. Rodríguez Saa nevertheless insisted that
the Peso would not be devalued. The Peso,
which, through the currency board, had been
pegged at parity to the dollar for 10 years,
was eventually devalued, and subsequently
left to float freely. With 70 percent of all
private debt denominated in dollars this was
indeed a disaster for ordinary Argentines
(Wheatley, 2001). The economic woes of 
the country, and specifically of ordinary
Argentines eventually spilled over and
sparked a political crisis in late 2001, early
2002, with executive powers being handed
over to three different interim Presidents
following the fall of De la Rúa, until finally
Senator Eduardo Duhalde was chosen to take
office for two years.
Various factors have been blamed for the
Argentine crisis, such as the rigid currency
board, the deficit spending of Argentine
politicians, and the vulnerability of political
institutions. According to Hector Schamis
(2002), however, these factors must be seen
in the context of particularly unfavorable and
volatile international conditions and a
complicated domestic political process. The
political institutions of democratic govern-
ance were highly fragile and vulnerable, after
a decade of rule by executive decrees during
the two consecutive presidencies of Carlos
Saúl Menem in the 1990s (Waiseman, 1999;
Santiso, 2001b). Moreover, Argentina had
been experiencing recession for four years,
which had eroded the fiscal base and
weakened its ability to service the debt. In
the context of the currency board, the
government could not intervene with
counter-cyclical policies to stimulate the
economy and Argentina’s debt repayment
risk-index eventually became increasingly
worse. This led to interest rate hikes and to
further debt repayment problems. According
to Schamis (2002), the crisis of 2001 had its
roots in the early 1990s, when President
Menem’s political ambitions inhibited the
establishment of sound macroeconomic
policies and firm institutional foundations.
Continued prioritization of political goals,
coupled with an unfavorable external
environment compounded the fragility of
the Argentine economy. 
International creditors began raising
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aggravating the situation. By the spring of
2001, Argentina was paying as much as 12
percent interest rates on much of its debt,
even though by the summer of 2001 its ratio
of debt to GDP and to exports was no worse
than that of Brazil (Schamis, 2002:85).
When the United States declared, in the
spring of 2001, that there ought to be no
bailout of Argentina, were it to get into more
serious trouble, default became all but
inevitable. 
Looking at Argentina’s composite risk
rating in Graph 4 below, there appears to be
no clear indication of a looming crisis. The
composite risk rating started to decline only
in mid-1999. In early 2001 the rating index
even pointed to a low risk, with the compo-
site rating during the months of January
through May ranging from 69.5 (moderate
risk) to 71.5 in May (low risk). Again, the
bold horizontal line at 60 indicates the level
below which the risk is deemed as high.
Below 50, the risk is seen as very high, and
above 70, the risk is seen as low. Between
January 1994 and mid-1999, Argentina was
indeed considered low-risk.
The Argentine crisis was essentially an
economic and financial one, but also sprung
from latent political vulnerabilities. Annex 2
provides a graphical overview of the country’s
risk profile. Looking at the economic risk
rating, several indicators were worsening in
the years leading up to the crisis. Argentina
had been in a recession for some time, and
irresponsible, politically motivated spending
patterns, in particular in the Provinces, had
seriously undermined the budget balance.
Moreover, a historically weak export sector
left little room for an export-led improve-
ment in the economy. In terms of the
financial risk rating, Argentina’s ability to
service its foreign debt was increasingly
undermined by the erosion of the fiscal base,
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international reserves continued shrinking.
The ICRG economic risk rating
nevertheless stayed well above the high-risk
mark and even indicates low-risk from
January 2000 through the early half of 2001.
It then dropped to moderate risk, but
increased slightly (indicating somewhat
lower risk) in January 2002. This seems
somewhat counter-intuitive, as the com-
ponents of the economic risk index, per
capita GDP, real GDP growth, annual
inflation rate, budget balance, and current
account as percentage of GPD, should have
been able to capture the imminent crisis.
GDP per capita dropped from the onset of
the crisis and real GDP growth was negative
during much of 2001 and 2002. Moreover,
the budget balance and current account
indicators were also strongly negative. It
would therefore seem that this indicator
should have detected the problems and
should have given some warning.
The financial risk rating appears, never-
theless, to have captured the coming
financial woes, as Argentina’s ability to
service its debt became increasingly weak.
Looking at the components of the financial
risk rating, foreign debt as a percentage of
GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of
exports, current account as a percentage of
exports, net foreign reserves, and exchange
rate stability, it is clear that virtually all of
these indicators worsened. Argentina’s
financial risk rating, according to the ICRG
model, dropped to a high-risk status in
January 2000, from a downward trend
initiated in late 1997. This high-risk warning
remained until October 2001, when the
rating increased to moderate risk, but then 
it dropped to high risk again in January
2002. 
The political risk rating gave little sign of
trouble ahead. Indeed, its is surprisingly flat
from mid-1993 until mid-2001. Even as the
government resigned at the end of 2001, and
there appeared to be some difficulty even
finding presidential candidates willing to stay
in the job for any length of time, the political
risk rating only indicated moderate risk.
Looking at the components and sub-
components of the political risk-rating index,
there should perhaps have been some
stronger indication of trouble. Government
stability, with its sub-components govern-
ment unity, legislative strength and popular
support, was certainly questionable at best,
while socioeconomic conditions, composed
of unemployment, consumer confidence and
poverty, were rapidly deteriorating. Corrup-
tion, moreover, has long been a significant
concern in the Argentine context, an element
that is only partially reflected in the ICRG
model. The case of Argentina highlights the
difficulty of the ICGR model to adequately
capture the weaknesses of the institutions of
governance in a democratic context. As the
model tends to give significant weight to
factors non-relevant to democratizing
countries such as Argentina (the degree of
internal and external conflict, military and
religion in politics and ethnic tensions
account for 42 percent of the political risk
rating), the model thus encounters difficulty
in accurately assessing the quality of govern-
ance in this type of regime. 
Most analysts had expected Argentina’s
default to be relatively contained, since the
country had warned the international com-
munity of its deteriorating economy during
some time before its actual default. Investors
thus had ample opportunity to reduce their
risk and exposure. While the risk of crisis was
reflected in the financial risk rating, the
extent of its economic and political woes,
however, does not appear to be correctly
reflected in the economic and political risk
ratings, leading the composite risk rating to
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ICRG model, a poor rating in one of the risk
categories may be compensated for by better
ratings in the other categories. This certainly
appears to have been the case in the ratings
for Argentina, as the composite risk rating
did not indicate significant risk, despite the
high financial risk. There exists indeed a
great risk of misinterpretation and mis-
calculation of political risk in the ICRG
model. As discussed above, disproportionate
weight is given to certain indicators, which
may not be very relevant in the case of
Argentina, nor, indeed, in the other two case
studies. Again, the problem of corruption is
significant in Argentina, and this is not
correctly reflected in the political rating, thus
understating the importance of the problem
and its consequences. The repercussions of
this misjudgment are important, as the
political risk rating accounts for half of the
composite country risk rating. 
Peru’s Pisco sour
Fujimori came to power in Peru following
the elections of 1990. Peru was then on the
verge of economic and social collapse,
following years of hyperinflation, and econo-
mic mismanagement under the government
of President Alan García, coupled with
guerilla violence, which seriously damaged
the country’s infrastructure and undermined
investor confidence. Fujimori introduced a
radical stabilization program that removed
price controls, froze public-sector wages and
cut social spending. He managed to bring
hyperinflation under control, but also led the
country into a deep recession (EIU, 2001b). 
Despite being highly successful in the
fight against terrorism, Fujimori’s in-
creasingly authoritarian style of government
soon became a liability (McClintock, 1999;
Levitsky 1999). In April 1992, as the
legislature began opposing his economic
policies as well as his strategy against
terrorism, he closed down Congress and
suspended the judiciary, with the support of
the military. Through the enactment of a
new constitution in 1993, and by
capitalizing on the damaged reputation of
the traditional parties, he managed to
strengthen centralism and enhance his own
powers. Though he was reelected in 1995, he
struggled to maintain his previous levels of
popularity. Dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment’s abuses of power and with the many
instances of corruption grew, and prompted
protests in Lima as well as in the provinces.
In December 1999, Fujimori announced
that he would seek an unprecedented third
term as president, and formed a new electoral
coalition, Perú 2000 (EIU, 2001b).
Throughout 1999, the administration made
serious efforts to discredit anyone who was
seen as a major threat to a victory by
Fujimori (Conaghan, 2001). The opposition
was highly fragmented and could not agree
on a single candidate to oppose the
incumbent. Nine opposition candidates
eventually ran for the presidency, thus seem-
ingly ensuring Fujimori’s victory. In the final
months of the campaign, however, oppo-
sition support started to coalesce around one
single candidate, Alejandro Toledo of Perú
Posible. Toledo ran on a ticket of greater
democracy and a continuation of free-market
reforms.
President Fujimori won (or rather stole,
as it was later confirmed) the first round of
the April 2000 presidential election and
eventually also managed to gain a con-
gressional majority for his Perú 2000. It was,
nevertheless, widely suspected that his
victory was largely a result of a sophisticated
electoral fraud, media manipulation, and
intimidation. Toledo, moreover, withdrew
his candidacy before the second round of
voting, citing insufficient conditions for free
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Organization of American States (OAS),
which had been monitoring the electoral
process, declared it to be flawed and with-
drew its observation mission. Suspicions of
wrongdoing by Fujimori and his entourage
were confirmed in September 2000, when a
videotape surfaced, showing Mr. Fujimori’s
security advisor and de facto head of the
intelligence service, Vladimiro Montesinos,
handing over US$15,000 in cash to a
congressman elected under the Perú Posible
banner, who subsequently defected to Perú
2000. The ensuing scandal led Fujimori first
to call for new elections, and then to flee to
Japan, from where he resigned as President.
Congress chose an interim president,
Valentín Paniagua, whose main responsibility
was to prepare new elections in April 
2001. 
Peru’s 2000 crisis was essentially a
political one. The political risk rating
included in Annex 3 reflects the low level of
stability in government that lingered from
the García years and which remained as
Fujimori became increasingly authoritarian.
From January 1993 onwards, as Fujimori
openly resorted to authoritarian methods of
government, the political risk rating started
to improve, reflecting in particular Fujimori’s
successful strategy at taming internal conflict
and achieve a greater degree of political
stability, law and order. Towards the mid- to
late 1990s, the political risk status was raised
to a level of moderate risk, as opposed to the
previous years of high or very high-risk levels,
remaining largely flat throughout the late
1990s. The risk level nevertheless hovered
around the 60-point mark, pointing to
lingering structural vulnerabilities. In early
2000, the risk rating dropped again to a
high-risk level, at the onset of the political
turmoil surrounding the 2000 elections.
Indeed, many of the components of the
political risk rating worsened at this time.
The exposure of abuses of power and
corruption scandals sent popular support for
the regime dwindling and heightened
instability. Increasing poverty rates in the
run-up to the 2000 elections were also
contributing to the lessening support for
Fujimori. Furthermore, Fujimori’s reliance
on the military continued to be an element
of concern. The fact that the ICRG model
does capture the seeds of the Peruvian
political crisis of 2000 also reflects the fact
that this crisis was one of the most widely
expected, and was foreseen by most analysts,
as it developed gradually over the few years
preceding it. 
The level of political risk nevertheless
seemed to have diminished in early 2000,
reaching a moderate level in the spring of
2000, then dropping again briefly in late
2001. Following the elections in 2001, and
the victory of Toledo’s coalition, the political
risk rating has been increasing, with only
moderate or low risk levels. Any indication of
tangible risk reflected in the political risk
rating was not, however, reflected in the
composite risk rating. As shown in Graph 4
below, the composite risk rating was well
above the high-risk mark in 2000 and
continued rising throughout the crisis. The
economic and financial risk ratings both
indicated low risk throughout the events of
2000, thus positively influencing the
composite risk rating. Nevertheless, the
political risk rating accurately captures the
end of the “honeymoon” period immediately
following the election of Toledo in mid-
2001. Annex 3 showing Peru’s country risk
profile provides a graphical overview of the
political, economic and financial risk ratings
for Peru. 
The comparison with 1992 is indeed
instructive. The political crisis sparked by
President Fujimori’s  autogolpe in 1992 was
122 Anja Linder and Carlos Santiso
02  NOPEC  29  (2)  Linder    09.12.03    13:50    Side  122reflected in a sharp drop in the political risk
rating of Peru. Political risk was already at a
level of very high risk prior to the autogolpe,
but subsequently dropped ten points to an
abysmal level. This heightened level of crisis
in 1992 was also reflected in the composite
risk rating. 
The composite risk rating nevertheless
fails accurately to capture the risk level
during the political crisis of 2000.
Compensated by the economic and financial
risk ratings, the ICRG overall risk rating for
Peru throughout the crisis remains at a
moderate to low level.
The case studies reviewed in this article
show mixed results regarding the predictive
powers of the ICRG model. The ICRG
model did, in some cases, correctly discern
the nature of an impending crisis and
somehow predict it, but in at least one
instance, the warning appeared to have
lagged behind actual events. In some cases,
the model failed to accurately capture the
warning signals of a crisis. A closer look at
some of the sub-components of the ICRG
risk ratings does show, moreover, that the
political risk rating, which typically is based
on survey data and individuals’ perceptions,
is particularly vulnerable to misinterpreta-
tion, as it appears to have reacted to actual
events rather than predicted them. This
finding thus leads us to question whether the
political risk indicator of the ICRG model
behaves more as a lagging indicator rather
than a leading indicator of crises.
Tentative Conclusions
The conclusions of this study have important
implications for policy and research:
perceptions matter. Indicators of political
risk and governance quality decisively
influence the investment decisions of
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more, they increasingly guide the aid allo-
cations of bilateral donors and international
financial institutions. The study highlights
the fragile foundations of political risks
analysis and, consequently, the limitation of
many cross-country econometric analyses
that often assume as a given, the accuracy of
the indicators of governance quality they use
to infer other things.
The study briefly reviewed three instances
of crisis to assess the predictive powers of the
ICRG model. The case studies included
three different types of crisis: an economic
crisis (Brazil in 1999); a crisis which started
out as a financial and economic one, but
which soon expanded into a political and
social one as well (Argentina in 2001-02);
and finally a political and electoral crisis
(Peru in 2000). The ICRG risk analysis
model showed mixed results in highlighting
the vulnerabilities leading to these crises. In
the case of the Brazilian devaluation, the
model did indicate a high level of overall risk,
but only once the crisis had actually erupted.
The economic risk rating indicated high risk
in January 1999, the same month the
devaluation was actually carried out. The
composite risk index did not drop to a high-
risk level until March 1999. 
In the case of Argentina, the composite
risk rating did not indicate any significant
risk of systemic crisis. Despite a sharp drop in
real GDP growth at the end of 2001, and
despite decreasing levels of per capita GDP as
well as an increasingly negative budget
balance, the economic risk rating did not
reflect the wider dimensions of the im-
pending crisis. Nevertheless, the financial
risk rating dropped to a high-risk level in
January 2000, well before the onset of the
crisis. As Argentina’s ability to service its debt
became increasingly weakened, the various
components of the financial risk-rating
category were able to pick up the signs and
pointed to a high risk early on.
The greatest shortcomings of the model
originate in the political risk rating. Indeed,
the ICRG model failed to capture the
institutional roots of economic vulnerability
and the political consequences of the econo-
mic collapse in Argentina. To the model’s
credit, it should be noted that few, if any,
analysts predicted the dramatic political
fallout of the Argentine crisis. Nevertheless,
despite dismal performance in most of the
indicators making up the political risk rating,
the model indicated only a low level of risk
until November of 2001, when it dropped to
a moderate risk. As for the political crisis in
Peru, the model did not indicate any overall
risk, as the political risk was compensated for
in the model by relatively low economic and
financial risk. The political risk indicator,
having remained at a level of high or very
high risk from before the 1990s until the
mid-1990s, dropped to a high level of risk
again at the end of 1999. The dip was,
nevertheless, quite small and brief. 
The study reveals a number of flaws in
the ICRG model. First of all, while it is
certainly valuable to allow for comparability
between countries, it is doubtful whether all
components and sub-components of the risk
categories are as relevant and of equal
importance in all countries at all times.
Consequently, it may be desirable to revisit
relative rating-weights to better capture the
systemic roots of political risk. Although the
ICRG allows users of its ratings to alter the
relative weights of indicators in order to
adapt them to their own needs, the ICRG
model and its forecasts are based on the
weightings presented in this study, and may
thus provide a somewhat skewed reflection of
reality.  
In the three countries studied, the
indicators on internal and external conflict,
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assessing country risk as they might be in
other countries. In the absence of any major
internal or external conflicts, these three
countries would earn a high mark in these
two categories, each accounting for 12
percent of the political risk rating. This
might cause the political rating score to be
unduly high, despite serious problems in
other areas, such as corruption or the rule of
law, which only account for six percent each. 
Second, the ICRG model assigns 50
percent of the aggregate value of country risk
to the political risk rating. This choice, which
reflects the importance of political economy
factors, may or may not be appropriate. It
might nevertheless be challenged on the
grounds that the political risk rating is the
most subjective component of the country
risk rating, as its sub-components typically
are based on survey data and individuals’
perceptions. The political risk rating might
even arguably be a lagging indicator, reacting
to developments in the economic and/or
financial sectors. For example, the indicator
of corruption for Argentina and Brazil
appears quite generous and overly stable over
time. Graph 4 below shows that, out of a
possible six points (six indicating the lowest
level of corruption), both countries were
awarded four points, indicating only
moderate risk, for almost a decade without
interruption. 
Looking at the specific example of the
impeachment of Brazilian President Collor
de Melo in September 1992, on the grounds
of corruption, it is clear that the model
simply reacted to this event and had
previously made an incorrect assessment of
the level of corruption in Brazil. Though the
news of the president’s potential involvement
in a corruption scandal broke in May of
1992, the model only downgraded Brazil’s
record on corruption in August, to a level of
high risk. Presumably, the level of corruption
in Brazil did not simply increase overnight,
but rather the model failed correctly to
capture the presence of systemic corruption.
Similarly, endemic corruption is a
structural weakness of governance in
Argentina. The autocratic tendencies of
President Menem, and in particular his
reliance on executive decrees, undermined
the institutions of accountability and judicial
checks and balances, especially during his
second term in office (1995-99). This trend
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corruption index throughout the 1990s.
However, the election of de la Rúa in late
1999 and the alternation in power it entailed
did not automatically lead to a reduction of
structural corruption, as the upgrading of the
ICRG corruption index in late 1999 seems to
suggest. True, the fight against corruption
figured prominently in the political agenda
in 1998-99 in the context in the electoral
campaign and, in December 1999, an anti-
corruption office was created within the
Ministry of Justice. However, the intrinsic
weakness of the rule of law and the fragility
of the mechanism of control in public
finance have deeper roots, as indicated by the
controversies surrounding the bankruptcy
and “economic subversion” laws between the
government and the IMF in early 2002 and
the impeachment process of the Supreme
Court initiated by the Argentine Congress.  
Undoubtedly, further research is required
to develop more robust methods to evaluate
the accuracy of country risk models and their
predictive powers. In particular, a more
rigorous assessment of the quality of each
component and sub-component of the
ICRG model would be required to ascertain
the predictive powers of each individual
indicator.  Yet, this study has shown the
difficulty of the ICRG model to accurately
capture the nuances of political risk in
similar types of regime (in this case con-
solidating democracies in emerging market
economies.) While such political risk models
do reflect changes of political regime, they
experience greater difficulty in capturing
changes within a political regime. 
Indeed, risk models tend to have great
difficulty in capturing the quality of
governance and the strength of political
institutions in consolidating democracies in
the gray area between overt dictatorship or
conflict countries and liberal democracy. In
particular, they tend to inadequately assess
the many realities of the wide spectrum of
regime possibilities with a democratic label.
While possessing the formal institutions of
democracy, many new and restored demo-
cracies fail to anchor its behavioral principles
and the modes of governance associated with
it. Indeed, a wide array of semi-democratic or
semi-authoritarian regimes has emerged,
with an extensive “gray area” in between.
Larry Diamond (1999) has aptly described
this gray area as a “twilight zone”.                    
New and restored democracies can adopt
many shapes and shades, between the two
extremes illiberal and liberal democracies
(O’Donnell, 1994; Zakaria, 1999). In-
creasingly, democracy is used with adjectives
to capture the reality of “hybrid regimes”
struggling to consolidate (Collier and
Levitsky, 1997). There is a pressing need to
devise new categories for capturing the many
realities and the great variety of hybrid
democracies that have emerged since the late
1980s. Ultimately, these considerations
question the intellectually elegant assump-
tion of a linear “democratization conti-
nuum,” from overt authoritarianism to
liberal democracy. Some scholars have
questioned the usefulness of the democratic
transition and consolidation paradigm to
describe the dynamics of democratization
and guide policy (Carothers, 2002; Dia-
mond, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2002;
Schedler, 2002, 2001 and 1998). While the
assumption of “linearity” of the traditional
democratic transition paradigm, reflecting a
gradual and progressive movement towards
democratic consolidation, is difficult to
justify (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2002), a
simple dichotomous distinction between
democratic and non-democratic regime is
even worse. Such dichotomies tend to be too
broad and sweeping. As new and restored
democracies struggle to consolidate,
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relation between regime type and economic
development to the intricate links between
regime quality and economic performance,
as the focus of reformers gradually shifts
from first to second-generation market
reforms (Pastor and Wise, 1999; Santiso
2004a and 2001c). This trend reflects
growing concerns about the effectiveness of
political institutions and the credibility of
economic policymaking (Knack and Keefer,
1995).
While recognizing the utility and
necessity of a means of assessing risk to
minimize exposure to it, it is also necessary to
acknowledge the limitations of country-risk
models. Two conclusions can be drawn. First,
such models must be recognized for what
they are, that is analytical tools to inform
judgment. Unrealistic expectations should
not be placed on them and statistical analyses
relying on them should be approached with
caution. Second, further research is required
to refine such tools and develop new ones.
Major efforts are being deployed in this
regard. Yet, the unavailability or unreliability
of time series data is a major hindrance to
our understanding of the dynamics of
political change and governance reform over
time, a shortcoming that will not be resolved
before a generation when more accurate date
will be available. In the meantime, the ICRG
remains one of the few sources of such data. 
Nevertheless, instead of further aggrega-
ting variables and constructing new ones, the
academic and policy communities ought to
examine more carefully how indices are
constructed and the nature of their
components. Risk ratings are highly sensitive
to the specific combination of indicators
used to obtain them, and it is thus critical to
ask what lies behind the numbers used to
make country forecasts. Political risk ratings
may indeed be composed of subjective
measurements, but they are critical to our
understanding of the overall risk profile of a
country. It is therefore essential to make
explicit the underlying assumptions of such
ratings and to consider the implications of
their use.
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Brazil: Political risk rating
Brazil: Economic risk rating
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Argentina: Political risk rating
Argentina: Economic risk rating
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Peru: Political risk rating
Peru: Economic risk rating
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